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Many problems of social choice take the following form. There are n voters
and a set K = {1,...,k} of objects. These objects may be bills considered by
a legislature, candidates to some set of positions, or the collection of char-
acteristics which distinguish a social alternative from another. The voters
must choose a subset of the set of objects.
Sometimes, any combination of objects is feasible: for example, if we
consider the election of candidates to join a club which is ready to admit as
many of them as the voters choose, or if we are modelling the global results
of a legislature, which may pass or reject any number of bills. It is for these
cases that Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) provided characteriza-
tions of all voting procedures which are strategy-proof and respect voter’s
sovereignty (all subsets of objects may be chosen) when voters’ preferences
are additively representable, and also when these are separable. For both of
these restricted domains, voting by committees turns out to be the family of
all rules satisfying the above requirements. Rules in this class are deﬁned by
a collection of families of winning coalitions, one for each object; agents vote
for sets of objects; to be elected, an object must get the vote of all members
of some coalition among those that are winning for that object.
Most often, though, some combinations of objects are not feasible, while
others are: if there are more candidates than positions to be ﬁlled, only sets of
size less than or equal to the available number of slots are feasible; if objects
are the characteristics of an alternative, some collections of characteristics
may be mutually incompatible, and others not. Our purpose in this paper
is to characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not
all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters’ preferences are sep-
arable or additively representable. As in Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou
1(1991), we can identify each set of objects with the value of its characteristic
functions, and thus with some vertex of the k-dimensional hypercube. Our
characterization tells us exactly what social choice functions will be strategy-
proof and onto for each given set of vertices, to be interpreted as the family
of feasible subsets from which society wants and can choose from. Our main
conclusions are the following. First: rules that satisfy strategy-proofness are
still voting by committees, with ballots indicating the best feasible set of
objects. Second: the committees for dierent objects must be interrelated,
in precise ways which depend on what families of sets of objects are feasible.
Speciﬁcally, each family of feasible subsets will admit a unique decomposi-
tion, which will dictate the exact form of the strategy-proof and onto social
choice functions that can be deﬁned on it. Third: unlike in Barberà, Sonnen-
schein, and Zhou (1991), the class of strategy-proof rules when preferences
are additively representable can be substantially larger that the set of rules
satisfying the same requirement when voters’ preferences are separable.
Our characterization result for separable preferences is quite negative:
infeasibilities quickly turn any non-dictatorial rule into a manipulable one,
except for very limited cases. In contrast, our characterization result for
additive preferences can be interpreted as either positive or negative, because
it has dierent consequences depending on the exact shape of the range of
feasible choices. The contrast between these two characterization results is
a striking conclusion of our research, because until now the results regarding
strategy-proof mechanisms for these two domains had gone hand to hand,
even if they are, of course, logically independent.
In order to compare our results with others in the literature, it is worth
noticing that our framework, where alternatives (sets of objects) can be ex-
pressed as vectors of zeros and ones, has been extended. Barberà, Gul, and
2Stacchetti (1993) extended the analysis to cover situations where the objects
of choice are Cartesian products of integer intervals, allowing for possibly
more than two values on each dimension. The pioneering work of Border
and Jordan (1983) considered functions whose range is any Cartesian prod-
uct of intervals in the real line. In there and in other contexts of multidimen-
sional choice where the range of the social choice rule is a Cartesian product,
strategy-proof rules are necessarily decomposable into rules which indepen-
dently choose a value for each dimension, and are themselves strategy-proof
(see Le Breton and Sen (1999a) and (1999b) for general expressions of this
important result).
In Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997) (see also Barberà, Massó, and Ser-
izawa (1998)) we considered the consequences of introducing feasibility con-
straints in that larger framework. The range of feasible choices is no longer
a Cartesian product and this requires a more complex and careful analysis.
All strategy-proof rules are still decomposable, but choices in the dierent
dimensions must now be coordinated in order to guarantee feasibility. While
these previous papers make an important step in understanding how this
coordination is attained for each given shape of the range, it is marred by a
strong assumption on the domain of admissible preferences. Speciﬁcally, we
assume there that the bliss point of each agent is feasible. This assumption is
not always realistic. Moreover, it makes the domain of admissible preferences
dependent on the range of feasible choices.
Several authors (Serizawa (1994) and Answal, Chatterji, and Sen (2003))
have studied the consequences of speciﬁc restrictions on the range, like budget
constraints or limitations on the number of objects that may be chosen.
These authors only consider the case of separable preferences, not the additive
case, which is the one providing some positive results. Our results apply
3generally and cover all types of infeasibilities within our context: ranges of
all shapes are allowed.
In the present paper we come back to the question of strategy-proofness
under constraints within a more limited framework, the one where only two
values can be taken by each of the components of k-dimensional vectors,
initially considered by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991). This is
done for clarity of exposition, given that in all other respects we are going to
substantially extend the previous analysis. One substantial extension consists
in that we can apply our result regardless of the nature and the form of
feasibility restrictions: our results apply to ranges of any shape. Budget
constraints, capacity limits, lower bounds on the number of objects to be
chosen are all speciﬁc cases that we cover with a single result. It is also
worth noticing that we tackle the case where all separable preferences, (and
all additive preferences) are admissible without any further restriction.
Perhaps the most important progress regarding previous results in this
literature comes from the new insights we get on the need for strategy-proof
rules to be decomposable. As already mentioned, when the range of the rule
is a Cartesian product, strategy-proofness requires and allows to decompose
global decisions into partial ones, one for each object (or for each dimension).
What we prove is that the decomposition of the range as a Cartesian product
is still essential in order to understand the possibility of deﬁning strategy-
proof rules. Even when a set is not a Cartesian product of k separate sets of
values, one for each object, it can always be decomposed in dierent pieces
(maybe only one, in the most degenerate cases), through what we call the
minimal Cartesian decomposition. Then, strategy-proof rules must be de-
composable into rules that choose in a strategy-proof manner within each of
these pieces (sections), and then aggregate these choices into a feasible alter-
4native. This structure generalizes our previous notions of decomposability,
which was restricted before to one of the cases where the decomposition into
C a r t e s i a nc o m p o n e n t si st r i v i a l .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminary notation
and deﬁnitions as well as previous results. In Section 3 we introduce speciﬁc
deﬁnitions and notation, obtain preliminary results, and present our two
characterizations: Theorem 1 for additive preferences and Theorem 2 for
separable ones. Section 4 contains an important ﬁnal remark: the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem is a corollary of our results. Section 5 contains the
proof of Theorem 1, omitted in Section 3.
2 Preliminaries
Agents are the elements of a ﬁnite set N = {1,2,...,n}. The set of objects
is K = {1,...,k}. We assume that n and k a r ea tl e a s t2 .G e n e r i ce l e m e n t s
of N will be denoted by i and j and generic elements of K will be denoted
by x, y,a n dz. Alternatives are subsets of K which will be denoted by X,
Y ,a n dZ. Subsets of N will be represented by I and J. Calligraphic letters
will represent families of subsets; for instance, X, Y,a n dZ will represent
families of subsets of alternatives and W, I,a n dJ families of subsets of
agents (coalitions).
Preferences are binary relations on alternatives. Let P be the set of
complete, transitive, and asymmetric preferences on 2K. Preferences in P
are denoted by Pi, Pj, P0
i,a n dP0
j.F o r Pi 5P and X  2K,w ed e n o t et h e
alternative in X most-preferred according to Pi as X (Pi), and we call it the
top of Pi on X. We will use  (Pi) to denote the top of Pi on 2K. Generic
subsets of preferences will be denoted by ˆ P.
5Preference proﬁles are n-tuples of preferences. They will be represented
by P =( P1,...,Pn) or by P =( Pi,P 3i) if we want to stress the role of agents
i’s preference.
A social choice function on ˆ P is a function F: ˆ Pn $ 2K.
Deﬁnition 1 T h es o c i a lc h o i c ef u n c t i o nF : ˆ Pn $ 2K respects voter’s
sovereignty if for every X 5 2K there exists P 5ˆ Pn such that F (P)=X.





K | there exists P 5 ˆ P
n such that F (P)=X
o
.
Denote by RF the set of chosen objects; namely,
RF = {x 5 K | x 5 X for some X 5 RF}.
Deﬁnition 2 A social choice function F: ˆ Pn $ 2K is manipulable if there
exist P =( P1,...,Pn) 5ˆ Pn, i 5 N,a n dP0
i 5ˆ P such that F (P0
i,P 3i)PiF (P).
A social choice function on ˆ P is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable.
Deﬁnition 3 A social choice function F: ˆ Pn $ 2K is dictatorial if there
exists i 5 N such that F (P)=RF (Pi) for all P 5ˆ Pn.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that any strategy-proof social
choice function on P will be either dictatorial or its range will have only two
elements. It would apply directly if any individual preference over the sets
of objects were in the domain. However, there are many situations were
agents’ preferences have speciﬁc structure due to the nature of the set of
objects, and this structure may impose meaningful restrictions on the way
agents rank subsets of objects. We will be interested in two natural domains
of preferences: those that are separable and those that are additive.
6Deﬁnition 4 Ap r e f e r e n c ePi on 2K is additive if there exists a function
ui : K $ I R such that for all X,Y  K







The set of additive preferences will be denoted by A.
An agent i has separable preferences Pi if the division between good ob-
jects ({x}Pi {>})a n dbad objects ({>}Pi{x}) guides the ordering of subsets
in the sense that adding a good object leads to a better set, while adding a
bad object leads to a worse set. Formally,
Deﬁnition 5 Ap r e f e r e n c ePi on 2K is separable if for all X  K and all
y/ 5 X
X ^ {y}PiXif and only if {y}Pi {>}.
Let S be the set of all separable preferences on 2K.W ec a ng i v eag e o -
metric interpretation to this set by identifying each object with a coordinate
a n de a c hs e tX of objects with a vertex of a k-dimensional cube; i.e., with
the k-dimensional vector of zeros and ones, where x belongs to X if and only
if that vector has a one in x’s coordinate. Sometimes we will make use of this
geometric interpretation. For instance, given X,Y  K the minimal box on
X and Y is the smallest subcube containing the vectors corresponding to X




K | (X _ Y )  Z  (X ^ Y )
ª
.
Following with this interpretation, it is easy to see that a preference Pi is
separable if for all Z and Y 5 MB( (Pi),Z)\Z, YP iZ.
Remark that additivity implies separability but the converse is false with
more than two objects. To see that, let K = {x,y,z} be the set of objects
and consider the separable preference
7{x,y,z}Pi{y,z}Pi{x,z}Pi{x,y}Pi{x}Pi{y}Pi{z}Pi{>},
which is not additive since {x}Pi{y} and {y,z}Pi{x,z}. Geometrically, addi-
tivity imposes the condition that the orderings of all vertices on each parallel
face of the hypercube coincide while separability admits the possibility that
some vertices of two parallel faces have dierent orderings. This geometric
interpretation will become very useful to understand the dierences of our
two characterizations.
To deﬁne voting by committees as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou
(1991) we need the concept of a committee.
Deﬁnition 6 A committee W is a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions
of N, which satisﬁes coalition monotonicity: if I 5 W and I  J,t h e n
J 5 W.C o a l i t i o n s i n W are called winning. A coalition I 5 W is a
minimal winning coalition if for all J Ã I we have that J/ 5 W.
Given a committee W,w ew i l ld e n o t eb yWm the set of its minimal
winning coalitions. A committee W is dictatorial if there exists i 5 N such
that Wm = {{i}}. Associated to each family of committees (one for each
object) we can deﬁne a special type of social choice functions.
Deﬁnition 7 A social choice function F : ˆ Pn $ 2K is voting by com-
mittees,i ff o re a c hx 5 K, there exists a committee Wx such that for all
P =( P1,...,Pn) 5ˆ Pn,
x 5 F(P)if and only if {i 5 N | x 5 RF(Pi)} 5 Wx.
A social choice function F is called V o t i n gb yq u o t aq (1  q  n)i ff o r
all x the committee Wx is equal to the family of coalitions with cardinality
equal or larger than q.
8We state, as Proposition 1 below, Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou
(1991)’s characterization of voting by committees as the class of strategy-
proof social choice functions on S,a sw e l la so nA, satisfying voter’s sovereignty.
Proposition 1 A social choice function F: Sn $ 2K (or, F: An $ 2K)
is strategy-proof and satisﬁes voter’s sovereignty if and only if it is voting by
committees.
To cover social choice problems with constraints we have to drop the
voter’s sovereignty condition of Proposition 1. But a result in Barberà,
Massó, and Neme (1997) tells us that the only strategy-proof rules in this
case must still be of the same form: this is stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Assume F: Sn $ 2K (or, F: An $ 2K) is strategy-proof.
Then, F is voting by committees.1
3 Two Characterization Results
3.1 The Need to Coordinate: Two Examples and an
Outline
Because of feasibility constraints, not all voting by committees can be guar-
anteed to always select a feasible alternative. The exact nature of the con-
straints, i.e., the shape of the range, will determine which combinations of
committees can constitute a proper social choice function for this range.
Example 1 below illustrates this fact. Moreover, under the presence of infea-
sibilities, there are voting by committees that, although respecting feasibility,
1It is easy to check that the proof of Proposition 2 in Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)
which covers the case of separable preferences also aplies to the smaller domain of additive
preferences.
9are not strategy-proof. Example 2 illustrates this possibility.
Example 1 Let K = {x,y} be the set of objects and N = {1,2,3} the
set of agents. Assume that {>}, {x},a n d{y} are feasible but {x,y} is not.
Voting by quota 1 does not respect feasibility because for any preference
proﬁle P,w i t ht h ep r o p e r t yt h a t(P1)=(P2)={x} and (P3)={y},
both x and y should be elected, which is infeasible. However, voting by
quota 2 does respect feasibility because x and y cannot get simultaneously
two votes (remember, agents cannot vote for infeasible outcomes) since the
complementary coalition of each winning coalition for x is not winning for y,
and viceversa. ¤
This idea will play an important role in our characterization with additive
preferences. As suggested by our example, when deﬁning a social choice
function by means of committees, we must guarantee that if all agents vote
for a feasible alternative, then the result must also be a feasible alternative.
This was the role played by the intersection property in Barberà Massó,
and Neme (1997). Here we shall ensure it by a combination of conditions,
one of which will be the choice of complementary committees under certain
situations. Complementary committees, following the hint provided in the
previous example, are formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8 We say that two committees W and Wc are complementary
if D 5 W implies N\D/ 5 Wc and D 5 Wc implies N\D/ 5 W.
The interested reader may check that our characterization results (The-
orems 1 and 2) guarantee that the intersection property in Barberà, Massó,
and Neme (1997) will be satisﬁed by the rules we deﬁne in each case.
Example 2 Let K = {x,y} be the set of objects and N = {1,2,3} the
set of agents. Assume that {>}, {x},a n d{y} are feasible but {x,y} is not.
10Consider the social choice function F deﬁned by voting by quota 3 (which
respects feasibility) and let P be any additive (as well as separable) preference
proﬁle such that (P2)=(P3)={y} and {x,y}P1{x}P1{y}P1{>}.S i n c e
2K\{x,y}(P1)={x}, y r e c e i v e st w ov o t e sa n dx one; therefore, F(P)={>}.





then y receives three votes and x none; that is, F(P0
1,P 2,P 3)={y}P1{>} =
F(P1,P 2,P 3). Hence, F is not strategy-proof. ¤
The purpose of our two characterizations is to identify exactly the subfam-
ilies of committees that simultaneously respect feasibility and are strategy-
proof for the domains of additive and separable preferences.
We begin with some intuition about the nature of our results. For that, we
ﬁrst remind the reader about the essential features of voting by committees
when there are no constraints, as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991).
There, the choice of a set can be decomposed into a family of binary choices,
one for each object. In each case, society decides whether the object should
or should not be retained, and the union of selected objects amounts to the
social alternative. If the methods used to decide upon each object are each
strategy-proof, then so is the method resulting from combining them into a
global decision, as long as the agent’s preferences are additive or separable.
Agents should be asked to express their best set, and under the expressed
domain restrictions this is equivalent to expressing those objects that they
would prefer to be included in the social decision, rather than not.
In our case, a ﬁrst dierence is that the choice of sets may not be decom-
posable to the extreme of allowing for independent decisions on each object.
Our results tell us precisely about the extent to which global decisions can
be decomposed, and say how to coordinate the decisions within groups of ob-
jects that require joint treatment. Indeed, in the presence of infeasibilities,
11the decision on what objects to choose, and which ones not to, can no longer
be decomposed into object-by-object binary decisions. For example, choos-
ing x might only be possible if y is not chosen: then the choices regarding
x and y must be joint. Similarly, z m i g h to n l yb ec h o s e ni fw is, and again
decisions involving these two objects need to be coordinated. Yet, if all fea-
sible choices of x and y, when coupled with any feasible choice for z and w,
turn out to be feasible, there is still room for decomposition of the choices in
two blocks of objects. If, on the contrary, further restrictions must be taken
into account, whereby certain feasible choices from x and y become incom-
patible with some feasible choices from z and w, then decomposition is not
possible. The paper provides a precise statement about the extent to which
decisions on what sets to choose can be decomposed into partial decisions
involving subsets (we call each part of the decomposition a section), in the
presence of feasibility constraints. Moreover, we discuss the characteristics
o ft h ec o m m i t t e e st h a tm u s tb eu s e di no r d e rt oc o o r d i n a t et h ec h o i c e so f
objects within each of the sections.
3.2 The Minimal Cartesian Decomposition of a Family
of Subsets
In this subsection, we shall describe the way in which any family of subsets
can be decomposed uniquely into what we call a minimal Cartesian decom-
position. This will be exactly the decomposition that will allow us to make
our previous statements precise, as expressed in Theorems 1 and 2, to be
found in Subsection 3.3 and Subsection 3.4. As we proceed, and in order
to help the reader through the new deﬁnitions, we introduce an example to
illustrate the new concepts.
12Example 3 Let K = {a,b,z,w,t} be the set of objects and assume that
the set of feasible alternatives M is
{{b},{b,t},{b,z},{b,z,t},{b,z,w},{b,z,w,t}}.
Notice that (1) a is never chosen, (2) b is always chosen, (3) w is only chosen
if z is, and (4) t can be chosen or not, whatever happens. ¤
Given a social choice function F: ˆ Pn $ 2K and a subset B of RF deﬁne
the active components of B in the range as
AC (B)={Y _ B | Y 5 RF}.
Active components of B are subsets of B whose union with some subset in
RF\B is part of the range.
Example 3 (Continued) The active components of the sets {z}, {z,w}
and {t} are AC ({z})={{>},{z}}, AC ({z,w})={{>},{z},{z,w}},a n d
AC ({t})={{>},{t}}, respectively. ¤





0)={C  RF\B | B
0 ^ C 5 RF}.
The range complement of a subset B0 of B is the collection of sets in RF\B
whose union with B0 is in the range. Notice that AC (B) can also be written
as
©




Example 3 (Continued) The range complement of the subsets {>}, {z},
and {z,w} relative to {z,w} coincide and they are all equal to {b}+{{>},{t}}.2¤
2Given two families of subsets of objects X and Y we denote by X +Y the sum of the
two; namely,
X + Y = {X ^ Y 5 2K | X 5 X and Y 5 Y}.
13A section is a group of objects with the property that the decision among
their active components can be made without paying attention to the infea-
sibilities involving objects on its complement.
Deﬁnition 9 As u b s e to fo b j e c t sB  K is a section of RF if for all active




Example 3 (Continued) The set {z,w} is a section of RF becauseAC ({z,w})=
{{>},{z},{z,w}} ( n o t i c et h a tt h es u b s e t{w} is not an active component of







{b} + {{>},{t}}. ¤
Remark 1 B = RF is a section of RF because CB
F (X)={>} for all active
components X 5 AC (RF)=RF.





Lemma 1 Let B be a section of RF and let B1 and B2 be such that
B = B1 ^ B2, B1 _ B2 = {>},a n dB1 is a section of RF. Then, B2 is also
a section of RF.







By deﬁnition of active component of B2, we can ﬁnd X,Y 5 RF such that
X2 = X _ B2 5 AC(B2) (2)
and
Y2 = Y _ B2 5 AC(B2).












where, given a set Z  K, Zc  K\Z. Notice, that to show that condition
( 1 )h o l d s ,i ti ss u !cient to show that Y _ Bc
2 5 C
B2
F (X2);t h a ti s ,
X2 ^ (Y _ B
c
2) 5 RF.
By condition (2), and since Bc
2 = B1 ^ Bc,
X2 ^ (Y _ B
c
2)=( X _ B2) ^ (Y _ B
c
2)
=( X _ B2) ^ (Y _ B1) ^ (Y _ B
c).
Claim 1 (X _ B1) ^ (X _ B2) ^ (Y _ Bc) 5 RF.
Proof Since Y 5 RF, (Y _B)^(Y _Bc) 5 RF. Therefore, Y _Bc 5 CB
F ( ¯ B)
for some ¯ B 5 AC(B). Moreover, since B is a section and X _ B 5 AC(B),
Remark 2 implies that (X _ B) ^ (Y _ Bc) 5 RF. Hence, (X _ B1) ^ (X _
B2) ^ (Y _ Bc) 5 RF, which is the statement of the claim.
Therefore, by Claim 1 and the hypothesis that B1 is a section,







1 5 AC(B1). Because (Y _ B1) 5 AC(B1) we have, by Remark 2,




Deﬁnition 10 A partition {B1,...,Bq} of RF is a Cartesian decompo-
sition of RF if for all p =1 ,...,q, Bp is a section of RF. AC a r t e s i a n
decomposition is called minimal if there is no ﬁner Cartesian decomposition
of RF.
15Example 3 (Continued) The partition {{b},{z,w},{t}} of RF is the min-
imal Cartesian decomposition of RF, since one can check that all of its ele-
ments are minimal sections. The section {z,w} is minimal since neither {z}
nor {w} are sections because, for instance, AC ({w})={{>},{w}} but
C
{w}




F ({w})={b} + {z} + {{>},{t}},
and hence, C
{w}
F ({>}) 6= C
{w}
F ({w}).
The proof that all other components of the decomposition are also mini-
mal sections is similar and left to the reader. ¤
Remark 3 Let {B1,...,Bq} be a partition of RF. Then, {B1,...,Bq} is a
Cartesian decomposition of RF if and only if
RF = AC (B1)+... + AC (Bq).
We want to show (Proposition 3 below) that, given any social choice
function F, its corresponding set RF has a unique minimal Cartesian decom-
position. In the proof of Proposition 3 we will use the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Let B1 and B2 be two sections of RF. Then B = B1 ^ B2 is
a l s oas e c t i o no f RF.
Proof Let B = B1 ^ B2 and assume that B1 and B2 are sections of RF.
Let X,Y 5 RF be arbitrary. They can also be written as
X =( X _ B) ^ (X _ B
c)
and
Y =( Y _ B) ^ (Y _ B
c).
16To show that B is a section, it is su!cient to show that (X_B)^(Y _Bc) 5
RF.R e w r i t eX and Y as
X =( X _ (B1\B2)) ^ (X _ (B2\B1)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2)) ^ (X _ B
c)
and
Y =( Y _ (B1\B2)) ^ (Y _ (B2\B1)) ^ (Y _ (B1 _ B2)) ^ (Y _ B
c).
Since B1 is a section, (Y _(B1\B2))^(Y _(B1 _B2)) and (X _(B1\B2))^
(X _(B1_B2)) belong to AC(B1),a n d(Y _(B2\B1))^(Y _Bc) 5 C
B1
F ((Y _
(B1\B2)) _ (Y _ (B1 _ B2))). Therefore,
(X _ (B1\B2)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2)) ^ (Y _ (B2\B1)) ^ (Y _ B
c) 5 RF.
By deﬁnition of the range complement of (Y _ (B2\B1)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2))
relative to B2,
(X _ (B1\B2)) ^ (Y _ B
c) 5 C
B2
F ((Y _ (B2\B1)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2))). (3)
Also, since X and Y belong to RF and B2 is a section,
(X _ B2) ^ (Y _ B
c
2) 5 RF. (4)
Rewriting condition (4), we have
(Y _ (B1\B2)) ^ (X _ (B2\B1)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2)) ^ (Y _ B
c) 5 RF.
Therefore,
(X _ (B2\B1)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2)) 5 AC(B2). (5)
Then, by conditions (3) and (5), the fact again that B2 is a section, and
Remark 2,
(X _ (B2\B1)) ^ (X _ (B1 _ B2)) ^ (X _ (B1\B2)) ^ (Y _ B
c) 5 RF.
17This implies that (X _ B) ^ (Y _ Bc) 5 RF. Hence, B is a section of RF. ¥
Proposition 3 Any set RF has a unique minimal Cartesian decomposi-
tion.




q2} be two distinct
minimal Cartesian decompositions of RF. There exists at least one pair such
that B1
p1 _B2
p2 6= {>} and B1
p1 6= B2
p2. By Lemma 2, B1
p1 ^B2
p2 is a section of
RF. By Lemma 1, B1
p1\B2
p2 is also a section of RF implying, again by Lemma
1, that {B1
1,...,B1
q1} was not minimal. ¥
3.3 Additive Preferences
We can now state our ﬁrst characterization.
Theorem 1 A social choice function F: An $ 2K is strategy-proof if and
only if it is voting by committees with the following properties:
(1) Wx and Wy are equal for all x and y in the same active component of
any section with two active components in RF’s minimal Cartesian decom-
position,
(2) Wx and Wy are complementary for all x and y in dierent active com-
ponents of the same section in RF’s minimal Cartesian decomposition, when
there are only two active components in this section, and
(3) Wx is dictatorial and equal for all x’s in the same section in RF’sm i n -
imal Cartesian decomposition, when this section has more than two active
components.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix at the end of the paper.
Our Theorem refers to the set RF, and is thus stated as if we started from
a given function F and then described the necessary and su!cient conditions
for this F to be strategy-proof. We can take another point of view, which
18is also compatible with our purposes. Start from any family M of subsets
of K. Interpret M as the set of feasible outcomes. We can then re-read
Theorem 1 as telling us everything about the strategy-proof social choice
functions which can be deﬁned onto M (which will then be the range of
these functions). True, there may also exist other strategy-proof functions
which start with a feasible set M and end up having a subset of M as the
range. But then, if there are alternatives that the designer is willing to give
up as possible outcomes, we might as well reinterpret them and include these
outcomes among those which we consider unfeasible, for practical purposes.
Example 4 below illustrates the statement of Theorem 1.
Example 4 Let K = {a,b,x,y,z,w,r,s,q,t} be the set of objects and
assume that the set of feasible alternatives is
M = {{b}}+{{>},{x},{y}}+{{>},{z},{z,w}}+{{r},{s,q}}+{{>},{t}}.
A n yv o t i n gb yc o m m i t t e e sF: An $ 2K will be strategy-proof and will have
RF = M as long as it satisﬁes the following properties: (a) by condition
(3) of Theorem 1, Wm
x = Wm
y = {{i1}} and Wm
z = Wm
w = {{i2}} for some
i1,i 2 5 N; (b) by condition (1) of Theorem 1, Wm
s = Wm
q ;a n d( c )b y
condition (2) of Theorem 1, Wr and Ws are complementary. To illustrate
these conditions, let N = {1,2} be the set of agents and consider the voting
by committees F where Wm
x = Wm
y = {{1}}, Wm
z = Wm







t = {{1,2}}. Observe that F satisﬁes
properties (a), (b), and (c), and hence, by Theorem 1, it is strategy-proof on
the domain of additive preferences and RF = M. ¤
193.4 Separable Preferences
In contrast with the unconstrained case, our results for separable preferences
are quite dierent (and much more negative) than for additive preferences.
Essentially, this is because in the presence of infeasibilities, agents are not
asked to vote for their preferred sets, but rather for their preferred feasible
sets. Hence, they may end up voting for their second best, their third best,
etc. Now: some of the individual objects they vote for may be retained, and
others not. Likewise, some objects they do not vote for can obtain. What
matters for strategy proofness is whether the best set for each agent among
those that contain some externally ﬁxed objects (those that are chosen in
spite of the agent’s negative vote) and do not contain some others (those
that are not chosen even if the agent supports them) is the set that contains,
in addition to those, as many elements from the agent’s preferred feasible
set. This is the case for additive preferences in all cases. It is also the
case for separable preferences if the ﬁrst best for the agent is feasible, but
not necessarily otherwise. That is why, in the presence of infeasibilities,
declaring the best feasible set may not be a dominant strategy for some
voters, even when committees are used (except if the ﬁrst best is always
feasible, a situation studied in Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)). Whereas
it is always a dominant strategy for additive preferences. This accounts
for the dierences in results under these two dierent domains. To further
illustrate this general point, we can go back to Example 3.
Example 3 (Continued) Let F: S2 $ 2K be deﬁned by the committees
Wm
z = Wm
w = {{1}}, and Wm
a = Wm
b = Wm
t = {{1,2}}. To see that F is
manipulable on the domain of separable preferences, consider any separable
preference P1 with the following properties:
(1)  (P1)={b,w,t} and RF (P1)={b,z,w,t}.
20(2) {b,z,w,t}P1 {b,t} and {b}P1 {b,z,w}.
Observe that P1 is not additive because adding t to {b,z,w} and to {b}
inverts its ordering. Take any separable proﬁle of preferences (P0
1,P 2) with
the properties that  (P0
1)={b} and  (P2)={b,z,w}. Then,
F (P
0
1,P 2)={b}P1 {b,z,w} = F (P1,P 2),
implying that F is manipulable by agent 1 at proﬁle (P1,P 2) with the pref-
erence P0
1. ¤
Theorem 2 below characterizes the family of strategy-proof social choice
functions when voters’ preferences are separable. Our result shows that the
class of strategy-proof social choice functions under additive representable
preferences identiﬁed in Theorem 1 is drastically reduced as a consequence of
this enlargement of the domain of preferences. This is an important novelty
with respect to the situation without constraints. Now, only social choice
functions with Cartesian product ranges (up to constant and/or omitted
objects,) are strategy-proof. Namely, the range of F h a st ob eas u b c u b e :
all sections of the minimal Cartesian decomposition of RF (the set of not
omitted objects) are singletons, either with the object itself as the unique
active component (constant object) or else with the object itself and the
empty set as the two active components. Formally,
Theorem 2 A social choice function F: Sn $ 2K is strategy-proof if and
only if it is voting by committees with the following property:
[P.1] If #RF  3 then either F is dictatorial or all sections of the minimal
Cartesian decomposition of RF are singletons.
Proof Let F: Sn $ 2K be a voting by committees satisfying property [P.1].
If F is dictatorial then it is obviously strategy-proof. If #RF  3 and all
sections of the minimal Cartesian decomposition of RF are singletons, then
21the set of active components in the range of each object x of this Cartesian
decomposition of RF is either {{>},{x}} or {{x}}. When the set of active
components is of the form {{x}}, this means that object x is always chosen.
When the set of active components is of the form {{>},{x}},t h e nv o t e r sh a v e
a choice between including x and not doing it. Leaving aside the constant
elements, which have no consequence for strategy-proofness, the remaining
choices between the objects with active components of the form {{>},{x}}
are of the type contemplated by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991).
Hence, since we assume voting by committees, then F is strategy-proof.
For the converse, assume that F is strategy-proof. By Proposition 2,
F is voting by committees. To show that F satisﬁes property [P.1] assume
#RF  3. Since all additive preferences are separable, Theorem 1 applies
to the subdomain of additive preferences. Therefore, the committees asso-
ciated to F satisfy conditions (1), (2), and (3) of Theorem 1. Assume F
is non-dictatorial. Then, condition (3) implies that the minimal Cartesian
decomposition of RF cannot consist of just one section with strictly more
than two active components. Therefore, and since #RF  3, the minimal
Cartesian decomposition of RF contains at least two sections. Now, notice
that when preferences are separable but not additively representable, the ac-
tive components of a section can be ordered dierently among themselves,
depending on which objects are present in another section. That is, for
each pair of sections B1 and B2 of the minimal Cartesian decomposition of
RF there exist at least one separable preference Pi 5 S, X1,Y 1 5 AC (B1),
X2,Y 2 5 AC (B2),a n dZ  RF\(B1 ^ B2) such that
(X1 ^ X2 ^ Z)Pi (X1 ^ Y2 ^ Z) and (Y1 ^ Y2 ^ Z)Pi (Y1 ^ X2 ^ Z). (6)
This can now be used to show that we cannot have a section with more
than two active components together with another section having more than
22one active component. To prove it, it is enough to construct proﬁles where
the presence of an object aects the ordering of the active components in an-
other section. Assume that a section B1 has the property that #AC (B1)  3.
Then, by property (3) of Theorem 1, for all x 5 B1, Wx is dictatorial (i.e.,
Wm
x = {{i}} for some i 5 N). Also assume that there exists another sec-
tion B2 such that #AC (B2)  2. Then, for all y 5 B2, Wm
y = {{i}},s i n c e
there exists a separable preference Pi satisfying condition (6). By applying
t h es a m ea r g u m e n tw ec o u l dp r o v et h a td i c t a t o r s h i pe x t e n d st oa l lo b j e c t s
belonging to sections with more than two active components. Therefore,
all sections have either only one active component (the objects that are al-
ways selected) or they have just two active components. Following a similar
argument to the one already used to establish condition (6) it is immedi-
ate to see that if a section has two active components they are of the form
{{>},{x}}. Hence, all sections in the minimal Cartesian decomposition of
RF are singletons.
4F i n a l R e m a r k
Until now, we have taken the dimension of our problems (i.e., the number
of objects), as well as the feasibility constraints, as given data. Our analysis
admits another reading without any formal change, except for its interpreta-
tion.
Consider a situation where society faces four alternatives, a, b, c,a n dd.
One possibility is that each of these alternatives might be described by two
characteristics, and that identifying a =( 0 ,0), b =( 1 ,0), c =( 0 ,1),a n d
d =( 1 ,1) provides a good description of the actual choices (this particular
choice would indicate that a and c are similar in the ﬁrst characteristic but
23dier on the second, etc.). It may also be, in another extreme, that these four
alternatives share nothing relevant in common. They can still be represented
as vectors of zeros and ones, but now it is better to embed them in I R4,
and identify them as a =( 1 ,0,0,0), b =( 0 ,1,0,0), c =( 0 ,0,1,0),a n dd =
(0,0,0,1). There may still be intermediate cases where three characteristics
are necessary and su!cient to distinguish between these four alternatives.
Two examples may be given by the cases
a =( 1 ,0,0), b =( 1 ,1,0), c =( 1 ,0,1),a n dd =( 0 ,0,0)
or
a =( 1 ,0,0), b =( 0 ,1,0), c =( 0 ,0,1),a n dd =( 0 ,1,1).
In the four-dimensional and three-dimensional cases, these four alternatives
are only some of the conceivable vertices of the corresponding cubes. Other
combinations of zeros and ones represent conceivable but unfeasible choices.
These examples suggest that the objects in our model (interpreted as
characteristics) may be taken as partial aspects of the overall alternatives
(whose role is played in our model by the feasible sets). This interpretation
is not restrictive: any alternative (out of a ﬁnite set) can be described by
a (ﬁnite) set of characteristics. What is restrictive is that once we identify
each alternative with a set of characteristics (thus embedding it into some
l-dimensional cube), we also determine the shape of the set of feasible alter-
natives, and this has consequences on the class of preferences which pass the
test of additivity (or separability).3
3Actually, identifying the alternatives of a social choice problem as points in a grid
can give us some interesting insights. In particular, many problems can be rewritten as
ones where alternatives are strings of 0 or 1 vectors. For example, the setting of Barberà,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) can be viewed as deﬁning rules to choose among the vertices
24In fact, thanks to the above observations, we can conclude by argu-
ing that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem arises as a particular corol-
lary of our Theorem 1. Indeed, take any ﬁnite set A = {x,y,...,w} of k
alternatives (k>2). Identify them with the k unit vectors and assume
that the set of feasible alternatives M is {{x},{y},...,{w}}.N o t i c e t h a t
all preferences over A a r er e s t r i c t i o n so fs o m ea d d i t i v ep r e f e r e n c eo nt h e
k-dimensional cube. Hence, we are considering the universal domain as-
sumption of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result. Let F : An $ 2A be such
that RF = {{x},{y},...,{w}}. The minimal Cartesian decomposition of
RF (= A) contains only the section B = {x,y,...,w}, whose set of active
components is AC (B)={{x},{y},...,{w}}.S i n c e#AC (B) > 2, condition
(3) of Theorem 1 tells us that only dictatorial rules are strategy-proof on
additive preferences. This is the conclusion we wanted.4
5 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on a decomposition argument that applies
an important result of Le Breton and Sen (1999a) to our context. This
argument, which will be exploited in the proof of Theorem 1, is expressed as
Proposition 4 below. But before, we need the following notation.
Let Pi be an additively representable preference on 2K and consider a
of a hypercube. This point of view has been expressed and used in Barberà (1996), (2001),
and Bogomolnaia (1998). It is the object of recent work by Nehring and Puppe (2002).
4In an earlier paper (Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997)) we had already used the
same embedding or identiﬁcation of alternatives with unit vectors in order to prove the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. In the earlier paper, this was a corollary of a dierent
characterization than the one we oer here. As a result, our arguments in the present
paper, which apply Theorem 1, are simpler and more direct than in the previous case.
25subset B of K. Let PB
i stand for the preferences on 2B generated by the
utilities which represent Pi.L e tAB be the set of additive preferences on 2B.
For a proﬁle P of preferences on 2K, PB will denote the proﬁle of preferences
so restricted, for all i 5 N.
Given a strategy-proof social choice function F: An $ 2K and a subset
B of objects, let FB: An






= F (P) _ B,
where P is any additive preference such that PB is generated by the utilities
which represent P.
Remark 4 Notice that, since F: An $ 2K is a strategy-proof social choice
function, it is voting by committees (by Proposition 2). Hence, for any




_ B for all P, ˆ P 5An such that PB = ˆ PB.
Therefore, FB is well-deﬁned.
Proposition 4 (a) Let F : An $ 2K be a social choice function and let
{B1,...,Bq} be a Cartesian decomposition of RF.I fF is strategy-proof then





for all P 5An.
(b) Conversely, let {B1,...,Bq} be a partition of K0  K and let {B1,...,Bq}
be a collection of subsets of objects, with Bp  2Bp for all p =1 ,...,q.L e t
FBp: An
Bp $ Bp be a collection of onto social choice functions, one for each





for all P 5An is strategy-proof, {B1,...,B q} is a Cartesian
decomposition of RF = K0, and RF = B1 + ... + Bq.
Proof (a) Assume {B1,...,Bq} is a Cartesian decomposition of RF and
let P 5An. Then,








FBp(PBp) by deﬁnition of FBp and PBp.
To obtain a contradiction, assume that FBp is not strategy-proof; that is,
there exist PBp, i,a n d ˆ P
Bp






i FBp(PBp).T h e r e -

















i : Bp $ I R representing P
Bp
i .
Take any P 5An generating PBp and ˆ Pi generating ˆ P
Bp




i = ˆ P
Bp0
i (8)




























































where the equality follows from condition (8) and the inequality follows from
condition (7). Therefore, F( ˆ P3i,P i)PiF(P);t h a ti s ,F is not strategy-proof.
(b) Let {B1,...,Bq} be a partition of K0  K and consider any P 5An,
i 5 N,a n d ˆ Pi 5A. Since for all p =1 ,...,q the functions FBp are strategy-
27proof, we have that FBp(PBp)R
Bp
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Hence, F(P)RiF( ˆ Pi,P 3i);t h a ti s ,F is strategy-proof. That {B1,...,Bq}
is a Cartesian decomposition of RF = K0 and RF = B1 + ... + Bq follow





for all P 5An.
Our strategy of proof for necessity relies heavily on invoking the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem for the case where there are more than three active
components in a section Bp of the minimal Cartesian decomposition of the
range. This is done by proving that, then, there will be three feasible out-
comes which agents can rank as the three most-preferred, and in any relative
order (a “free triple”). But FBp must be strategy-proof if F is (Proposition
4). If FBp was non-dictatorial, we could use it to construct a non-dictatorial
and strategy-proof social choice function over our free triple, which we know
is impossible by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. As for the case where
a section has two active components only, notice that we can divide the ob-
jects of this section into two sets, such that all the elements in one of the sets
obtains when those on the other don’t, and vice-versa. Our restriction that
the committees corresponding to these two sets of objects are complementary
guarantees that no vote can lead to choose at the same time objects from
these two active components. Otherwise, no further restriction is imposed
on our committees by strategy-proofness when only two outcomes arise.
28Now, we state and prove that whenever a section in the minimal Cartesian
decomposition of RF contains more than two active components, then we get
a dictator. This is achieved by showing that a free triple always exists in this
case.
Proposition 5 Assume that the following properties of RF hold: (1) the
minimal Cartesian decomposition of RF has a unique section and (2) #RF 
3. Then, there exists i 5 N such that for all k 5 RF, Wm
k = {{i}}.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 By conditions (1) and (2) there exists Z 5 2K
such that Z/ 5 RF. Without loss of generality ﬁrst assume that there exists
x such that either Z ^{x} 5 RF or Z\{x} 5 RF. Moreover, by rotating the
hypercube to locate Z to its origin and redeﬁning all coordinates accordingly,
assume that Z = {>} and {x} 5 RF.L e ty 5 RF\{x} be arbitrary. We will
show that there exists i 5 N such that Wm
x = Wm
y = {{i}}. We will
distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: There exists D 5 RF such that y 5 D and MB(D,{>})_RF = {D}.
Subcase 1.1: Assume MB(D ^ {x},{>}) 6= {{x},D}. Since MB(D,{>})_
RF = {D} there exists B such that {>} 6= B  D, B ^ {x} 6= D,a n d
B ^ {x} 5 MB(D ^ {x},{>}) _ RF.
Subcase 1.1.1: Assume B Ã D. Without loss of generality assume that
MB(B ^ {x},{x}) _ RF = {B ^ {x},{x}}. Then we can generate, by an
additive preference with top on {>}, the orderings D Â1 {x}Â 1 B ^ {x},
{x}Â 2 D Â2 B ^ {x},a n d{x}Â 3 B ^ {x}Â 3 D, by an additive preference
with top on B, the orderings D Â4 B ^ {x}Â 4 {x},B^ {x}Â 5 {x}Â 5 D,
and B^{x}Â 6 D Â6 {x}. Moreover, by associating large negative values to
objects outside D ^ {x}, we must be able to put these three alternatives at
the tops of the individual orderings. Therefore, we have a free-triple on the
29elements of the range D,{x},a n dB ^{x}. Then the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem implies that there exists i 5 N such that Wm
x = Wm
y = {{i}}.
Subcase 1.1.2: Assume B = D.Because MB(D ^ {x},{>})_RF 6= {{x},D}
then D ^ {x} 5 RF. Then MB(D ^ {x},{x}) _ RF = {{x},D^ {x}},
MB(D ^ {x},D) _ RF = {D,D ^ {x}}. Notice that MB(D,{>}) _ RF =
{D}. Therefore, using an argument similar to the one already used in the
proof of Subcase 1.1.1, we have a free triple on elements of the range D,{x}
and D ^ {x}, and again, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem implies that
there exists i 5 N such that Wm
x = Wm
y = {{i}}.
Subcase 1.2: Assume MB(D ^ {x},{>})={{x},D}.
Subcase 1.2.1:T h e r ee x i s t sC 5 RF, such that C _ (D ^ {x}) / 5 {{x},D}.













_RF = {D} we
have a free triple on elements of the range D,{x} and C, implying that there
exists i 5 N such that Wm
x = Wm
y = {{i}},b e c a u s ey 5 D.
Subcase 1.2.2:F o ra l lC 5 RF,C_ D ^ {x} 5 {{x},D}.
Claim 1 Assume that for all C 5 RF either {x}  C or D  C. Then,
there exists A,B 5 RF and Z 5 {{x},D} such that:
(1.1) MB(A,B) _ RF = {A,B}.





_ RF = A,
where A =( A ^ ({x} ^ D))\Z and B =( B ^ ({x} ^ D))\Z.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :Since RF has the property that its minimal Cartesian
decomposition has a unique section there exits G 5 RF and Z 5 {{x},D}




K | E =( E ^ ({x} ^ D))\Z for E 5 MB(H,Z) _ RF
ª
.
30Denote  Z = x if Z = D or  Z = D if Z = x. Because G 5 MB(G,Z) _









_ RF.L e t B b et h ee l e m e n ti nt h er a n g ew i t hm i n i m a l











Let A 5 MB(B,Z)\B be such that MB(A,B)={A,B}.C o n d i t i o n ( 9 )




_ RF = A.T h i sp r o v e st h eC l a i m .
Let A,B 5 RF and Z 5 {{x},D} be such that conditions (1.1), (1.2),
and (1.3) of Claim 1 hold. Then we can generate, by an additive preference
with top on A ^ { Z}, the orderings A Â1 B Â1 A, A Â2 A Â2 B,a n d
A Â3 A Â3 B, by an additive preference with top on B^{ z}, the orderings
B Â4 A Â4 A and B Â5 A Â5 A, and by an additive preference with top
on B, the ordering A Â6 B Â6 A. Therefore, we have a free-triple on the




Case 2: Assume that for every D 5 RF such that y 5 D, there exists B 6= D
such that B 5 MB(D,{>}) _ RF.
Let D be such that
MB(D,{y}) _ RF = {D} (10)
and let B be such that
MB(B,{>}) _ RF = {B}. (11)
If y 5 B then we are back to Case 1. Therefore, assume that y/ 5 B. For




31Subcase 2.1: Assume that {x,y} 5 RF. We claim that MB({y},B) _
RF = {B}. To see it, assume that there exists C 6= B such that C 5
MB({y},B)_RF.I fy 5 C then C 5 MB(D,{y})_RF contradicting con-
dition (10). If y/ 5 C then C  B, contradicting the fact that C 6= B because
MB(B,{>}) _ RF = {B}. Moreover, since MB({y},D) _ RF = {D} and
MB({y},{x,y})_RF = {x,y} we can generate all orderings on D,B,{x,y}




Subcase 2.2: Assume that {x,y} / 5 RF. First suppose that MB({y},B) _
RF = {B}.S i n c e MB({y},D) _ RF = {D} and MB({y},{x}) _ RF =
{x} (remember, by condition (10) we know that y 5 RF)w ec a ng e n e r -
ate all orderings on D,B, and {x} (with these three subsets on the top);
therefore, there exists i 5 N such that Wm
x = Wm
y = {{i}}.S u p p o s e
that MB({y},B) 6= {B}. We claim that D = B ^ {y} and therefore
MB({y},B)={B,D}. To see it, let C 5 MB({y},B).I f y 5 C then,
by condition (10), C = D and C = D ^ {y}.I fy/ 5 C then C  B and, by
condition (11), C = B.N o w , i f MB({y},B) _ RF = {B,D} we can also
generate all orderings on D,B, and {x} with two preferences: one with top
on y (orderings D Â1 B Â1 {x}, D Â2 {x}Â 2 B,a n d{x}Â 3 D Â3 B)a n d
the other with top on {>} (orderings {x}Â 4 B Â4 D, B Â5 D Â5 {x},a n d
B Â6 {x}Â 6 D).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 To prove necessity, let F: An $ 2K be a strategy-
proof social choice function and let {B1,...,Bq} be the minimal Cartesian
decomposition of RF, which exists by Proposition 3.
(1) Assume that x,y 5 Z1 5 AC(Bp)={Z1,Z 2}.S i n c e {B1,...,B q} is
minimal we have that Z1_Z2 = {>}. Assume that Wm
x 6= Wm
y ; that is, there
exists I 5 Wm
x such that I/ 5 Wm
y .C o n s i d e ra n yP such that (Pi)_Bp = Z1
32for all i 5 I and (Pj) _ Bp = Z2 for all j 5 N\I. Then, x 5 F(P) and
y/ 5 F(P) contradicting that x and y belong to the same active component
of Bp.
(2) Assume x 5 X, y 5 Y ,a n dAC(Bp)={X,Y}.T oo b t a i nac o n t r a -
diction assume there exists D 5 Wm
x and N\D 5 Wm
y .I ti se a s yt oﬁ n dP
such that x,y 5 F(P) contradicting that x and y belong to dierent active
components of Bp.
(3) Follows from part (a) of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
Su!ciency follows from part (b) of Proposition 4, since it is clear that
all social choice functions deﬁned on each of the sections are onto the active
components of the section and strategy-proof.
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